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Abstract 
 
Intergovernmental transfer system is one of the key components of the local governmental 
financing system. It role is to equalize the position of the local governments (LGS) and in 
this way to enable them to fulfill large variety of competencies which have been in the last 
couple of decades broaden far beyond the traditional one, which includes areas of local 
administrations and various social functions. Nowadays, these competences include issues 
such as local economic development, local infrastructure development, local investment 
programs, pro-active local employment policy and other. The issue of LG financing and 
the specific role of intergovernmental finance system in Serbia has been especially 
emphasized with enforcement of law on local government financing (2007), the intention 
was to insure the stable and predictable source of LGS financing which should decisively 
contribute to improve the effectiveness of management process in planning and 
implementing local budgets. Unfortunately, just after two years of applying of the law, the 
global finance crises broke and the strongly negatively impacted its effects, which 
eventually resulted in its suspension in some of its most important aspects. 
 
Key words: local governments system reform, shared vs. own LGs revenues, 
revenue equalization, fiscal decentralization, budget transfers, financial position 
of local governments 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2000, the local government finance system in Serbia has undergone 
significant reforms which have actually improved the position of local 
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changes in Serbia: Strategic directions for economic development and harmonization with 
EU requirements) and 47009 (European integrations and social and economic changes in 
Serbian economy on the way to the EU) and, financed by the Ministry of Science and 
Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. 
2 Prof dr Zvonko Brnjas, Associate Professor, Belgrade banking Academy, Belgrade, 
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governments, according to financial indicators. Total local government revenues 
per capita were continuously growing in real terms until 2008. In 2009 and 2010, 
there was a decline in local revenues, but in real terms they are still higher than at 
the beginning of the mentioned period.  
 
The Law on Local Government Finance, enacted in 2006 and came into force in 
January 1, 2007, has a very important role within the reform process. The most 
important aspect of this law is the introduction of a specific intergovernmental 
financing structure (from central government to local government units) through 
the system of transfers.  
TRANSFERS FROM HIGHER TIERS OF GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF 
REVENUE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
The Law on Local Government Finance established two main groups of transfers: 
 
• Earmarked transfers - this group of transfers pertains to the funds 
transferred from the Republic direct budget beneficiaries (primarily from 
ministries) to local government units in order for them to finance concrete 
projects or activities. Therefore, they are not regular (they are not 
transferred at regular intervals, for instance annually), instead they are 
project based and must be spend for strictly defined project purposes.  
• Non-earmarked transfers - as opposed to earmarked transfers, these 
funds are transferred at regular intervals and are of general purpose, i.e., 
are transferred to LGU budgets without any special guidelines in regard 
to their spending purpose. This means that LGUs may independently 
decide how to use these funds, similarly or identically, to the way in 
which they use other budget revenues. 
 
Because of the above described features non-earmarked transfers have gained on 
importance within the intergovernmental finance system. They have been 
introduced with obvious intentions to support specific, very important functions 
of the newly devised system, and first of all, its equalization functions and 
increased stability and predictability of local government finances.  
 
In order to additionally emphasize these specific features of the transfer system 
the Law has specified that non-earmarked transfers should account for a total of 
1.7% of the GDP of the country. This amount is to be calculated according to the 
last officially available statistics at the moment of calculation (it is GDP from the 
previous year). Other information needed for calculation of total amounts as well 
as the structure and distribution of transfers by LGUs are specified according to 
the official data from the same year. 
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According to the Law on Local Government Finance the following four types of 
non-earmarked transfers have been defined: 
 
• Equalization transfer  
• Compensation transfer  
• Transition transfer, and 
• General transfer  
Equalization transfer  
Equalization transfer has a high-priority position among other transfers, and 
because of that it is to be calculated before other, the above mentioned, non-
earmarked transfers. It is calculated based on the Republic average of shared 
revenues per capita. Municipalities which „qualify“for receiving this transfer are 
those with shared revenues per capita are below 90% of the Republic average, 
calculated without the cities. These municipalities receive the amount of 
equalization transfer which will bring them to the targeted level (to 90% of the 
Republic average of municipal shared revenues per capita). 
Compensation transfers  
Compensation transfers are transfers specified as funds used to compensate LGUs 
for revenues lost due to amendments of tax rules affecting local budget revenues 
passed by the Republic in previous period of time. They are defined on the 
permanent base – once they are calculated they became regular revenue of the 
LGs. It is even specified in the Law that their real value is safeguarded by 
correcting its nominal amount for average annual inflation rates. 
 
According the Law, the compensation transfers are supposed to be distributed to 
the LGs which have lost certain sources of budget revenues due to the changes in 
system laws. The most significant LG system changes which are related to this 
transfer were canceling the tax on salary fund and the sale tax. In order to 
compensate the decrease of local budget revenues because of these measures the 
share of LGs in salary tax was increased to 40%. In the case of 39 out of 145 LGs 
(mostly the “richer” LGs including Belgrade) this remedy measure was not 
sufficient. In the case of Belgrade in order to fully compensate this gap this share 
should have been increased to 62% (instead only to 40%). The argument in the 
case of Belgrade for provide this compensation was that Belgrade is the main 
trade centre in which are shopping not only the citizens of Belgrade but as well as 
citizens from all other cities who are visiting the Capital. The same could be 
applied to the cases of other cities and more developed LGs. So 39 LGs has been 
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assigned compensation transfers to the level which fully compensated the gap in 
revenues created in described way. 
Transition transfers  
Transition transfers are distributed to LGUs in a situation when calculation of 
their transfers changes due to change in their revenues. The transition transfers are 
calculated for the period of three years. In the first year the whole amount lost is 
compensated for, in the second 50% and in the third 25% of the same amount. In 
the second and third years, the initial amount is adjusted for the current inflation 
rate. This transfer is intended for both units of local governments, municipalities 
and cities. However cities may count on it only when their losses exceed 5% of 
their total revenues as opposed to municipalities which have the right to its total 
amount regardless of the degree of their losses.  
General Transfer  
This transfer is distributed to all LGUs, in other words to cities and municipalities 
alike. It is important to note that the general transfer is calculated last – after all 
the above mentioned transfers have been calculated and subtracted from the total 
amount reserved for non-earmarked transfers.  
 
The criteria for calculation of this transfer have been defined by the law. They 
pertain to the size of population (65%), and territory (19,3%), number of school 
children in primary schools (4,56%), number of children in secondary schools 
(2,0%), number of buildings for primary schools (1,14%), number of buildings for 
secondary schools (0,5%); number of children covered by child care (6,9%) and 
number of buildings for child care (1,5%). 
 
Equalization of positions of LGUs in terms of their revenues is done also by the 
general transfer. This additional equalization mechanism works as follows: the 
general transfer for local government units where shared revenues per capita are 
50% above the average is reduced 40%. Funds obtained in this way are in the 
form of general transfer distributed to local government units whose average of 
shared revenues is below the mentioned limit.  
“Robin Hood” mechanism (transfers redistribution) 
The part of the methodology of transfers’ calculations is mechanism of additional 
transfer redistribution colloquially called “Robin Hood” mechanism. This 
mechanism is applying as the second iteration in transfers’ redistribution. This 
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correction refers to reduction of transfers to LGUs with shared revenues 50% 
above the Republic average (index 150). Their revenues were reduced by 40% of 
the difference above the limit and revenues obtained in such way were distributed 
to other LGUs by applying the same criteria used to distribute general transfers.  
THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM 
The above described mechanism (first of all) of non-earmarked transfers has two 
main objectives and two basic features stemming from them: 
 
• Equalization of LGUs – the whole logic, as well as the manner in which 
the system of non-earmarked transfers works, point out that one of the 
system's basic goals is to make LG units equal in terms of available 
revenues per capita. In addition to equalization transfer where this 
equalization function is explicit, general transfer are as well contributing 
to the equalization of LGs position because it is distributed in accordance 
to specific unit measures like number of inhabitance, surface, etc. In 
addition to this general transfer has as well purpose to provide a 
minimum level of revenues related to locally provided services.  
• Stability and predictability of LG revenues – in the period before the 
Law on LG Financing was introduced, one of the main remarks regarding 
its effect were referring to the problems and difficulties in projecting 
budget revenues in coming budget year and consequently in planning 
expenditures and all activities LGUs need to perform in a budget year. 
This issue has become particularly sensitive as local government 
functions broadened in the social domain, in infrastructure development 
and in the domain of local economic development in general. 
FUNCTIONING OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM 
Transfer system in 2007 and 2008 
The above described model of transferring funds from the Republic to local 
budgets functioned for only two full budget years: 2007 and 2008. Transfers were 
defined and then transferred to LGUs in accordance with the described 
mechanisms and within limits (Table 1). 
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Transfer system in 2009 
In 2009 the world financial crisis caused dramatic changes in the area of public 
finances. The Republic Government entered negotiations with the IMF at that 
time and as a result of their negotiations a comprehensive two year financial 
arrangement was set up.  
 
Part of the agreement which pertained to local government finances specified that 
total non-earmarked transfers to LGUs needs to be reduced from 40.7 billion 
dinars to 25.7 billion dinars, i.e., to be reduced by 15 billion dinars. This decision 
became effective when the Law on Amendments and Addenda of the Budget Law 
for 2009 was adopted. These changes simply suspended the main part of 
intergovernmental finance system: namely, the 1.7% GDP requirement was 
simply disregarded.4 The suspension became effective after the first four months 
of 2009 (January-April). Therefore, amendments of the Budget Law were based 
on two basic assumptions: 
 
• The first, and most important for the system as a whole, is the mentioned 
a priori reduction of transfers to LGUs by 15 billion dinars; 
• The second is that the transfer system has not been eliminated, but rather 
suspended, which is confirmed by the fact that instead of changing 
particular elements of the system (for instance by changing shared 
revenues distribution ratios), the transfers for 2009 were calculated by 
using the described methodology and then the local government total 
budgets were simply reduced. The key part o this methodology refers to 
defining „redistribution” of the reduction across budgets of all LGUs.  
Transfer system in 2010-11 
When transfers for 2010 and 2011 were calculated the same suspension of the 
Law on Local Government Finance, in the part pertinent to calculation of total 
transfers and their distribution to local government units, was retained. 
Exemptions thereof were specified in the Budget Law of the Republic of Serbia 
for 2010 and 2011. 
 
No additional calculations were used to calculate transfers for 2010; instead the 
Budget Law took over exact values of transfers and their distribution to LG units 
identical to that for 2009. 
                                                   
4 It could be said that system was „frozen" as it was defined in 2009, and in the next years 
it was just replicated: in 2010 without any change in the amounts and structure of the 
transfers and in 2011 without changes in the structure, but with increased total amount. 
Brnjas Z, Dedeić P. 
- 243 - 
 
Transfers for 2011 with 23.8% (index 123.8) increase were 31.8 billion dinars. 
The increase is a result of particular government's efforts to reduce discrepancy 
between the actual amount of transfers and 48 billion dinars which would have 
been transferred had the Law on Local Government Finance been fully applied. 
Amounts for particular LGUs were specified by a linear increase (23.8%). 
METHODOLOGY FOR TRANSFER REDUCTIONS APPLIED IN 2008 
Before finalizing the draft Law on Amendments and Addenda of the Budget Law 
of the Republic of Serbia of 2009, the simulation of the effects of transfer 
reductions based on total budgets has been performed. The following five basic, 
and the sixth one which is derived from the fifth models - were considered:  
 
Model 1: Linear (proportional) reduction of non-earmarked transfers for all LGs 
 
Model 2: Adjusted starting methodology for calculating LG transfer reductions  
 
Model 3: Fixed transfer reductions - equal transfer reductions for all LGs  
 
Model 4: Fixed transfer reductions - equal transfer reductions for all LGs – with 
exemption of poorer LGs  
 
Model 5: Transfer reductions in line with economic power and flexibility of LG 
budgets to adjust to decreased amounts of revenues 
 
Model 6: This model, which was eventually adopted and applied, is actually 
modified version of model 5. 
Model 1: Linear (proportional) reduction of non-earmarked transfers 
for all LGs 
As explained, the non-earmarked transfers for 2009 were reduced from 40.7 
billion dinars to 25.7 billion dinars – the difference is 15 billion dinars or 36.9%. 
In this model the mentioned percentage of reduction would be applied to transfers 
to all local government units. This model was evaluated in the following manner: 
 
Advantages 
Easy to understand and simple to implement.
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Disadvantages 
Given the different share of transfers in total local budgets the linear reduction of 
36.9% at the same time would mean a very different percentage of reduction of 
total local budgets for different LGs. The share of reductions in local budgets 
ranges from 3.95% to 28.6%. 
The most developed local governments experience the lowest reduction, and the 
poorest, with the lowest flexibility to adjust to change in revenues, are affected 
by the highest percent of budget reduction.  
Model 2: Adjusted starting methodology for calculating LG transfer 
reductions 
This model assumes that the reduction of transfers would be performed by 
adjusting the original methodology for transfer calculations by applying the 
following steps: 
• Proportional reduction of compensation and transition transfers  
• Keeping equalization transfer on the planned 2009 level  
• The remaining amount up to 25.7 billion dinars is distributed in the form of 
general transfer  
 
This model was evaluated in the following manner: 
 
Advantages 
Provides smaller and more acceptable range of discrepancy in transfer reductions 
distribution among LGs compared to the linear model. Budget reductions. In this 
case differences would range from 2.6% to 13.5%. 
Disadvantages 
The largest budget reductions are seen in the least developed municipalities the 
same as in the linear model only to somewhat milder extent while developed local 
governments are affected by smaller reductions. 
The burden of transfer reductions bear mostly local government units entitled to 
compensation transfer as a replacement for their lost revenues due to changes in 
distribution of shared revenues.  
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Eventually, this model was seen as conceptually unacceptable, because it 
undermines the basic concept, the methodology and the criteria for calculation of 
non-earmarked transfers as specified in the Law on Local Government Finance. 
Model 3: Fixed transfer reductions - equal transfer reductions for all 
LGs 
Basically this model is built on an idea to put all government units in an equal 
position, by defining a fixed level of reduction for all local budgets. 
 
Reduction of revenues, at that (through transfer reductions), by 15 billion dinars 
of total current local budget revenues in 2008 amounted for 8.54% reduction. This 
model was evaluated as follows: 
 
Advantages
Transfer reductions are adjusted to total actual generated revenues therefore all 
local government units experience the same reduction of their budget revenues per 
capita.  
Disadvantages
Despite of a significant conceptual improvement and taking into consideration 
capacity of local government units to adjust to their revenue reduction, the fact 
remains that budget flexibility is not the same in developed and underdeveloped 
local governments and fixed percentage of reduction, apart from a significant 
improvement compared to the previous models still puts less developed local 
government units in somewhat disadvantaged position. 
Model 4: Fixed transfer reductions - equal transfer reductions for all 
LGs – with exemption of poorer LGs 
This model implies that the poorer municipalities would be exempted from 
transfer reductions, that is, the reduction of total budget revenues.  
For this, it would be used the same criterion as the one used for calculation of 
equalization transfer (90% of the Republic average of shared revenues). In this 
way the burden of 15 billion in transfer reductions would be shifted to the 
remaining local government units. In this case the proportional reduction rate 
should be 9.58%. 
 
This model was evaluated as follows: 
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Advantages
Poorer local government units, with shared revenues per capita in 2008 below 
90% of the Republic average would not be affected by transfer reductions  
Disadvantages
A shortcoming of this solution is unequal reduction of budgets of those local 
governments which are right above or below the dividing line. Thus, for instance, 
a municipality which is slightly below the 90% limit (e.g. 89.9%) would not be 
affected by transfer reductions while a municipality slightly above the 90% limit 
(90.1%) would experience 9.58% reduction of its total budget revenues. 
Also, the same as in the previous model (fixed reduction rate applied to all LGs 
without exemption) when reducing revenues not much consideration is given to 
ability of local government units to adjust to the said reduction of their budget 
revenues. 
Model 5: Transfer reductions in line with economic power and 
flexibility of LG budgets to adjust to decreased amounts of revenues 
This model of transfer reductions suggested: 
 
• Continuous reduction of transfers in compliance with limit set by the 
methodology. 
• In order to enable such compliance it is introduced the so called „irreducible 
part of budget revenues“. The subject of reduction by applying a uniform rate 
through a process of „trial and error“method is the remaining part of total 
revenues. 
• Within this model several sub-models have been tested which differ from 
each other in the amount of unreduced budget revenues and result in 
different, wider or narrower range of transfer reductions. 
 
Models that were tested included „irreducible“ parts ranging from 3,000 to 7,000 
dinars per capita The example in the following table shows calculation of 
reductions for two local government units (Aleksandrovac, representing the poor 
and Belgrade representing the right local government units) in the model where 
„irreducible part of the budget” is 7,000 dinars. 
 
Below, an overview of transfer reductions range is provided depending on the 
amount of „irreducible“part of the budget per capita.  
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Table 1. Overview of transfer reduction in accordance with amount of irreducible 
part of local budgets 
 
Part of the budget which is 
not subject to reduction  
- in dinars - 
Level of reduction of total LG budget revenues  
from to 
7,000 -1.69% -10.39% 
6,000 -3.00% -10.17% 
5,000 -4.20% -9.82% 
4,000 -5.26% -9.51% 
3,000 -6.22% -9.24% 
 
 
This illustration shows that the range of budget reduction expands as part of the 
budget which is not subject to reduction grows. If part of the budget which is not 
subject to reduction is set as 7,000 dinars per capita total budget of the poorest 
municipality will be 1.69% smaller, while the richest municipality will be affected 
by 10.39% reduction. In the case when irreducible part of the budget is 3,000 per 
capita the reductions are 6.22% and 9.24% respectively. 
Model 6: Adopted model – upgraded version of model 5 
The Local Government Finance Commission found at one of its sessions that 
Model 5 is the most acceptable, however, in their criticism of this model they 
pointed that its further implementation (should reductions in the transfer system 
continue throughout the following years) could negatively impact local 
government's motivation to collect its own revenues. With the aim of overcoming 
this weakness a sub-model has been suggested where the property tax and self-
contribution fee would be left out from the total local budget subject to reduction. 
These corrections resulted in creation of Model 6. 
 
Compared to its original model this newly suggested model where the above 
mentioned revenues are left out from the calculation of transfer reductions keeps 
almost the same range but this time at a slightly higher level of reduction (e.g. it is 
1.76% instead of 1.69% and 10.47% instead of 10.39%). Problem with this model 
is larger number of LGUs with over 10% of budget reductions (five LGUs instead 
of one anticipated in Model 5).  
 
This model was evaluated as follows: 
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Advantages
Transfer reductions are in line with flexibility of local budgets to adjust to their 
reduced total budget revenues. The poorest municipalities are affected by the 
lowest reductions which gradually increase as budget revenues per capita go up. 
By choosing „irreducible“ part of the budget it is possible to come up with 
various ranges of reduction and make compromises between more and less 
developed local government units 
Disadvantages
In order to achieve the above described results it is necessary to apply somewhat 
complex methodology for calculation of transfer reductions, or rather, total 
budget revenues of local government units, as described above, which may make 
it difficult to understand 
 
However, possible difficulties in understanding the methodology would not cause 
problems in its practical implementation considering that obtained results are 
clear and applicable (amount and percentage of reductions are precisely 
determined which clearly points what the original aim was – even reduction of 
revenues depending on budget revenues per capita).  
 
The Local Government Finance Commission failed to reach consensus at its 
repeated session about the best model of transfer reductions, therefore after 
voting, the majority decided to suggest modified Model 5 to the Ministry of 
Finance for adoption.  
Model 6: Transfer reduction methodology – adopted model 
After taking into consideration all the above described models of transfer 
reductions and comparing their advantages and disadvantages the Government of 
the Republic of Serbia, in general, decided to accept the last one (Model 5). As a 
result of compromise a modality based on the following concrete assumptions has 
been defined and was applied to local government units which were affected by 
the highest reductions: 
 
• Part of the budget per capita which is not subject to reduction was set at - 
3,000 dinars per capita  
• Transfer reductions may not exceed 50% of transfers which were 
specified in the budget document for 2009  
• Also, an additional condition is that no local government unit may be left 
without transfers in the period May-December of the current (2009) year. 
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It is estimated that these additional assumptions enabled keeping the criterion 
according to which budget reduction percentage depends on the amount of 
revenues per capita. In this proposal, budget reduction percentage would range 
between 5.4% and 11.1%, and the largest number of municipalities would be 
affected by reductions between 8% and 10%. These ranges differ from the 
previously presented ranges for Model 5 because of the newly introduced 
corrective factor, that is, a condition that no LG unit can be affected by more than 
50% reduction in transfers. 
 
The following table shows effects of transfer reductions in the adopted 
methodology on illustrative examples of five LGUs: Aleksandrovac, Belgrade, 
Kragujevac, Čačak and Jagodina.  
 
Table 2. Illustrative calculation of transfer reductions within the accepted model 
for five local government units  
 
No Description Aleksandrovac Belgrade Kragujevac Čačak Jagodina 
1. Total revenues in 2008, 000 RDS 270,506 71,443,714 4,963,145 1,899,457 1,664,573 
2. Population 29,389 1,576,124 175,802 117,072 70,894 
3. Revenues per capita  9,204 45,329 28,231 16,225 23,480 
Part of the budget which is NOT subject to reduction
4. per capita, RSD  -3,000
Part of the budget which is subject to reduction
5. per capita, RSD  6,204 42,329 25,231 13,225 20,480 
6. total, 000 RSD  182,339 66,715,342 4,435,739 1,548,241 1,451,891 
 Calculation rate  12.28%
7. 2009 transfer, 000 RSD 148,956 11,133,500 843,141 540,470 342,735 
8. 
50% limit of 
transfer reduction, 
000 RSD 
-74,478 -5,566,750 -421,571 -270,235 -171,367 
9. 
Transfer reduction 
(up to 50%), 000 
RSD 
-22,398 -5,566,750 -421,571 -190,179 -171,367 
10. % of transfer reduction  -15.0% -50.0% -50.0% -35.2% -50.0% 
  % budget reduction  -8.3% -7.8% -8.5% -10.0% -10.3% 
 
For the initial assumption that about 3,000 dinars per capita will not be subject to 
reduction, with the method of „trial and error” it was calculated that the average 
rate of reduction of the remaining part of the budget would be 12.28%. 
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Reductions in transfers are calculated by applying this rate to part of the budget 
which is subject to reduction. For instance, for Aleksandrovac this rate resulted in 
15% reduction in transfer and 8.3% reduction of total budget and for Čačak these 
reductions are 35.2% and 10.0%.  
 
For Belgrade, Kragujevac and Jagodina applying the defined rate of 12.28% 
would cause more than 50% of reduction in transfers. Since the limit is 50% their 
transfer reduction is set to be 50% and consequently their total budget reduction 
percentage changed into 7.8% for Belgrade, 8.5% for Kragujevac and 10.3% for 
Jagodina. 
EFFECTS OF TRANSFER SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PERIOD 
2007-2010 
The following lines show how the described transfer system has been 
implemented in the period from 2007 to date, including the plan for 2011. As 
presented in Table 1. the transfer system functioned in accordance with the Law 
only in the first two years (2007 and 2008). It was then when the methodology for 
calculation and distribution of transfers was fully applied; thus, equalization 
transfer, compensation and transition as well as general transfer were calculated 
and transferred. At the end transfer were corrected by applying the so-called 
„Robin Hood“transfer. 
 
Table 3. Transfers in the period 2007-2011, in millions RSD 
 
 Transfers/Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (plan) 
Earmarked transfers 
Equalization transfer 2,613.3 2,980.5 - - - 
General transfer  11,298.9 14,829.4 - - - 
Compensation transfer 17,830.3 20,691.8 - - - 
Transition transfer 648.8 345.2 - - - 
Correction of transfers (so called 
“Robin Hood”) - 2,641.3 - 2,708.2 - - - 
TOTAL earmarked transfers 29,750.0 36,138.6 25,681.0 25,681.0 31,800.0 
Non-earmarked transfers
Non-earmarked transfers 5,598,5 5,203.6 2,993.7 7,094.8 NA 
TRANSFERS-TOTAL  35 531.1 41 422 4 28 674.7 32,775.8 NA 
 
In 2007 transfers were 35.5 billion, out of which 29.8 billion dinars referred to 
non-earmarked transfers. In 2008 this amounts increased to 42.4, i.e. to 36.1 
billion. In 2009 the whole system was suspended and 41.7 billion dinars of 
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planned non-marked transfers were simply reduced for 15.0 billion dinars. The 
reduction was applied by means of a specific methodology which is described 
below. In 2010 the same amount of non-earmarked transfers was applied with no 
changes or correction while a significant nominal increase of 23.8% has been 
planned for 2011 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Changes of non-ear marked transfers distributed in the period 2007-
2011, indices 
 
Years 2008/2007 2009/2008 2010/2009 2011/2010 2011/2007 
Indices 121.5 71.1 100.0 123.8 106.9 
 
 
Table 5 shows the structure of transfers in the mentioned period. It is interesting 
to note that compensation transfers, with the basic function to preserve the 
existing LGU positions in terms of budget revenues, had the highest share of all 
transfers (around 50%). As said, the compensation transfers are distributed to 
those LGUs which are losing part of their budget revenues on certain grounds 
(often due to legislation changes). They are allocated permanently and at that they 
are adjusted for the inflation rate every year.  
 
 
Table 5. Structure of distributed non-earmarked transfers in the period  
2007-2011, in % 
 
 Transfers/Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Plan) 
Earmarked transfers
Equalization transfer 7.4% 7.2% - - - 
General transfer  31.8% 35.8% - - - 
Compensation transfer 50.2% 50.0% - - - 
Transition transfer 1.8% 0.8% - - - 
Correction of transfers 
(Robin Hood) -7.4% -6.5% - - - 
TOTAL earmarked 
transfers 83.7% 87.2% 89.6% 78.4% 31,800.0 
Non-earmarked transfers
Non-earmarked transfers 15.8% 12.6% 10.4% 21.6% NA 
TRANSFERS-TOTAL  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% NA 
 
General transfers are next important transfers that accounted for 32% and 36% of 
all transfers in respective years.  
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The so-called „Robin Hood“ correction although applied only to Belgrade and 
Novi Sad, accounted for significant 7.4% and 6.5% of all transfers in respective 
years.  
 
Equalization transfers in 2007 and 2008 accounted for 7.4% and 6.5% of total 
transfers, which can be deemed insufficient given their function it is important to 
consider the number of LGUs which obtained this transfer as well as the number 
of them which didn't. In 2007, the transfers were distributed to 87 LGUs, and out 
of 145 LGUs in Serbia 58 didn't receive transfers on this ground (Table 6.). 
 
Table 6: Overview of the LGUs which have received equalization transfers 
 
 Years 2007 2008 
Number of LGUs which received 
equalization transfer  87 91 
Number of LGUs which didn't receive 
equalization transfer  58 54 
 
In 2008 these numbers changed into 91 and 54 respectively. 
CURRENT CHALLENGES 
During the 2011 the intergovernmental financing system has enter into the focus 
of public interest in Serbia due to the efforts of some of the political parties to 
enforce a process of decentralization of Serbian governmental system. The 
initiative, among other, included the following changes: 
 
• The change of the shares of the central vs. local governments in total 
amount of income taxes collected at LG territories: the share of LGs 
increased from 40% to 80%. This applies to all LGs (cities and 
municipalities, except Belgrade which share is limited to 70%); 
• The non-earmarked transfers for LGs are continued to be calculated by 
applying indicator of 1.7% of GDP, but now they are distributed unevenly 
in accordance with the level of LGs development. The least developed 
LGs are getting 100% of these funds; the following groups of LGs ranged 
by level of development are getting 90%, 70% and 50%, respectively.5  
                                                   
5 The classificationof the LGs by the level of development is perfomed by applying the 
Indicators of LGs Economic Development created by Republic Ministry of Economic and 
Regional Development. 
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• The City of Belgrade is calculating, but not getting any of these transfers 
from the level of central government. From the funds calculated for 
Belgrade the so called solidarity fund is to be created and then distributed 
to above mentioned four groups of LGs in the following proportions: 
50%, 30%, 10%, 10%, respectively.  
• The transition transfer, as well as the corrective mechanism colloquially 
called Robin Hood” - are cancelled. 
 
The effects of the new Law are still not quite clear since it is enforced from the 
beginning of July 2011. However, based on some preliminary simulations, 
some of the main risks and challenges could be identified: 
 
• In financial terms the redistribution of funds between Central and local 
level as an effect of Law enforcement will represent 44 billion RSD. 
Since this change is not followed by corresponding redistribution of the 
competencies between these governmental levels, this amount will simply 
additionally burden the Republic budget. At the same time the limit to the 
deficit of Republic budget is already clearly set, it is not clear how this 
amount will be provided. The Republic Fiscal Council (the body which 
was established with the purpose to indicate this kind of situation) as well 
as IMF, has already clearly pinpoint the risks related to this solution.  
• The biggest “winners” in budget transfers redistribution will be indeed 
the least developed LGs. On the other hand, when in this calculation are 
included as well as the effects of increase of the shares in income taxes, it 
appears that eventually the biggest “winners”, in absolute terms, are the 
most developed LGs, first of all cities, including Belgrade.6 
CONCLUSION 
During the first decade of 21st century the system of LGs financing in Serbia has 
passed through significant reform changes. As a result of this process the 
competencies of Serbian LGs (municipalities and cities) have considerably 
broaden, which by definition has improved their financial position. 
 
The key changes in the LGs finance system are related to the Law of local 
government financing which was adopted in 2006 and enforced from the 
beginning of 2007. This Law has provided to the LGs lager stability and 
predictability of the inflows into the local budgets. Unfortunately as a 
                                                   
6 This should not be a surprise having in mind that the largest employment centers are the 
biggest urban areas, i.e. the biggest cities. 
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consequence of the financial crises, some of the major parts of the Law have been 
suspended in 2009, and to the present it is kept ineffective.  
 
Restoration and then its further broadening of the reform process in this area are 
key for providing of the sustainable development of the LGs. This refers to the 
further development of LGs´s administrative and social competencies and at the 
same time increasing of the economic-development competencies, such as 
development of local infrastructure, supporting local business and employment of 
inhabitance.  
 
Important aspect of LGs financing which has been paid special attention in the 
work is the financial position of the local governments, i.e. the level of their 
(un)equalization. One of the most important components of the mentioned Law 
has been devoted to the system transfers from central to the local level of 
governments, which main purpose was to equalize the financial position of the 
LGs. 
 
The newest development in this area has been referred to improvement of the 
financial position of LGs (increase share of total funds available to LGs) and at 
the same time to equalization of their financial position. The newest changes in 
the Law of LG financing have increased the share of income taxes which are 
transferring to the LGs but in such a way that the poorest LGs get more and richer 
less of the transfers.  
 
However, having in mind the present state of public finance in Serbia and the 
imperative to decrease the public deficit till 2015, which is set by the Law of 
Budget System, the sustainability of these solutions is questionable, and not only 
in a short term, but as well in the medium and longer term.  
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